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21 Introduction
Modern industrial society runs on fossil fuel. Burning fossil fuel releases thermal energy
which is then transformed into electricity. Electricity is a key input in the production of goods
and services destined for mass consumption. Consumers derive satisfaction from the
consumption of these mass produced goods. In modern society, sustained improvement in the
average level of consumption is a key indicator of material wellbeing and improved living
standards. The use of fossil fuel not only generates thermal energy but it also releases
greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, methane and others) into the atmosphere
causing global warming and climate change. Until recently the environmental consequences
of industrialisation were largely ignored. The global threat of a catastrophic climate change
has helped raise awareness and brought countries together in favour of a coordinated policy
response.
In a globalised world of free trade and migration (to a lesser extent), global
governance of climate change mitigation is challenging. It is relatively inexpensive for
industrial production to cross borders and move to cheaper locations. Indeed, starting from
the 1980s the world has noticed a significant dislocation of industries from the industrialised
nations to the emerging markets significantly increasing the latter’s share of greenhouse gas
emissions. Coupled with the global challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions the
abovementioned migration of polluting industries brings in a key question of distributive
justice in a Rawlsian sense3. To what extent the emerging market economies should be
allowed to emit so that the twin objectives of sustainable development and reducing global
greenhouse gas emissions could be achieved? Indeed these twin objectives are enshrined in
many of the official documents on climate change commissioned and authored by multilateral
3 Note that Rawls (1971) explicitly refrained from applying his principles of justice beyond the
confines of a territorial state. Relevance of Rawlsian principles to global governance were discussed in later
interpretations elsewhere (see Pogge, 1989).
3institutions. For example, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)4 defined in the Kyoto
Protocol also emphasises the importance of these twin objectives (IPCC, 2007). In particular,
the CDM aims to: (1) assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development while
preventing catastrophic climate change, and (2) help industrialised countries reach their
greenhouse gas emissions target.
At the operational level, states around the world have aimed to address these
challenges by making use of both bilateral and multilateral institutional mechanisms. In
particular, countries have used the mechanism of international transfers especially in the field
of energy to achieve the twin objectives of emissions reduction and sustainable development.
Policymakers have been using these policy tools for at least three decades now yet the effects
are not very well known. To the best of our knowledge, there is hardly any systematic
quantitative research on the effect of environmental aid on emissions in the aid recipient
countries. In this paper, we seek to explore this very question: Do we notice a perceptible
difference in the level of emissions in the aid recipient countries as a result of energy related
aid going back to the 1960s?
A cursory look at the global aggregates reveals that both foreign aid commitment and
disbursement for the energy sector (especially electricity generation) have exploded over the
last decade. For example, per capita aid disbursement for power generation over the 2000s
have grown by 4 percent on average every year whereas the annualised growth rate of aid
commitment in power generation for the same period is approximately 5 percent. Carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions however have increased at an annualised rate of 2.5 percent over the
same period. Emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2) have declined since the mid-1990s largely
due to the introduction and subsequent adoption of unleaded fuels for transport. Figures 1 – 4
presents this data.
4 The CDM is a mechanism intended to produce emission reduction units through certified projects
which then could be traded in emissions trading schemes (ETS).
4Even though there has been some degree of co-movement between emissions and
environmental aid it is problematic to interpret this association as causal. What we plot are
global trends which ignore variations within and across countries. A third latent factor could
also be responsible for the co-movement which hardly makes this perceived association
causal. Furthermore, there is no obvious theoretical prior when it comes to the effect of
environmental aid on emissions. On the one hand policymakers in donor countries would
expect results in terms of reduced emissions through better targeting of the energy
infrastructure in the recipient countries. On the other hand environmental aid could very well
be off target and is spent on projects that have little discernible impact on emissions.
Therefore, the lack of a strong prior either way makes this policy design a prime candidate
for empirical audit. A more detailed and systematic modelling is necessary to understand the
co-movement in the raw time series data.
In this paper we aim to systematically explore the effect of energy related aid on CO2
and SO2 emissions. In particular, we analyse the effect of an energy related aid shock on
emissions using a panel data model. We exploit a global panel dataset covering up to 131
countries over the period 1961 to 2011. Note that our aid data is sourced from AidData.org.
This dataset is an improvement over the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and offers far wider country coverage.
Furthermore, our dataset also allows us to distinguish between renewable and non-renewable
sources of power generation, and energy supply infrastructure. We estimate a parsimonious
model using fixed effects, Arellano and Bond, and Anderson and Hsiao estimators and do not
find any evidence of a systematic effect of energy related aid on emissions. Some would
argue that the effect of aid is perhaps conditional on country specific fundamentals such as
nature of policy or quality of institutions. We are unable to distinguish the average effect
from zero even after interacting the aid variable with the rule of law index, corruption, degree
5of democracy, private property rights, government effectiveness, and openness to trade.
The zero effect could be driven by potential heterogeneity across very low income
and relatively advanced economies. It is entirely plausible that relatively advanced economies
are far more efficient in adopting greener technologies for power generation whereas the very
low income economies are rather slack. If this is indeed the case then one would expect to see
opposing effects across the two samples. To our surprise we observe no such evidence of
non-linearity in the relationship and the average effect stays zero.
We also test any potential heterogeneity across continents by dividing the sample into
Asia, Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Middle
East and North Africa (MENA). With the exception of ECA the average effect remains zero
across all other continents. We notice some evidence of emission reduction as a result of
environmental aid in ECA. Our results are robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects,
country specific trends, time varying common shocks, GDP per capita, and GDP per capita
squared as controls. The exclusion of outliers and the inclusion of additional covariates such
as trade openness, urbanisation, human capital, investments, population density, and per
capita energy use do not alter our fundamental result of zero average effect.
Empirically identifying the causal effect of environmental aid on emissions is
challenging because potential biases from simultaneous and reverse causation. This challenge
is not specific to the macro environmental economics literature but in fact part of a broader
challenge associated with the aid and development literature. We follow the empirical
methodology of Clemens et al. (2012) to tackle identification challenges. Clemens et al.
(2012) argue that it may take time for most aid disbursement to have an impact on other
macroeconomic variables as they are generally lumpy and work through multiple channels.
Therefore, they show that transparent methods of lagging and differencing the data are
superior to using poor quality instrumental variables which tends to magnify the problem of
6reverse causation. Following Clemens et al. (2012) we use five year averages as observations
and use lags in the model. The model is estimated using the Anderson and Hsiao method
along with fixed effects and Arellano and Bond dynamic panel data estimation methods.
Clemens et al. (2012) present Anderson and Hsiao estimates as their preferred results.
The paper makes the following contributions. First, it performs a much needed
econometric audit of the policy of environmental aid. Climate change is a major challenge of
our generation and it is extremely important that some of the existing macro policies are
thoroughly scrutinised using scientific means. To our surprise, we did not find any other
study asking the obvious question: what impact energy related aid has on emissions? Second,
by bringing this scientific result to the academy and the policymakers our paper opens the
way for much needed future scientific scrutiny of policies in this arena.
Our paper is related to a large literature on the determinants of emissions. This
literature could be divided into two strands: (1) a literature based on the Stochastic Impacts
by Regressions on Population, Affluence and Technology (SIRPAT) methodology and (2) a
literature based on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Examples of the former are
Narayan and Narayan (2010), Menz and Kühling (2011), and Menz and Welsch (2012).
Narayan and Narayan (2010) focus on the effect of affluence by using economic growth as
the key explanatory variable whereas Cole and Nemayer (2004), Menz and Kühling (2011)
and Menz and Welsch (2012) focus on population size and population aging. Numerous other
studies seek to verify the EKC. The EKC model predicts an inverted U shaped relationship
between income and emissions. In other words, environmental pollution is increasing in
income up to a certain threshold beyond which environmental pollution is in fact declining in
the level of income. Torras and Boyce (1998), Auci and Becchetti (2006), and York et al.
(2003) are good examples of empirical studies of EKC. Dinda (2004) presents a review of the
EKC literature.
7In addition to the SIRPAT and EKC based studies, a large literature examines
additional determinants of pollution. This literature finds that trade openness (Grossman and
Krueger, 1993), quality of political institutions (Scruggs, 1998; Farzin and Bond, 2006; and
Bernauer and Koubi, 2009), and urbanisation (Zhu et al., 2012; and Sadorsky, 2014) affects
air quality.
Finally, our paper is also related to a voluminous empirical literature on aid and
development. Griffin and Enos (1970) launch this literature with bivariate regressions on aid
and growth followed by Weisskopf (1972) and Papanek (1972). More recently some of the
notable studies are Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dollar (2002),
Easterly (2003), Rajan and Subramanian (2008), and Clemens et al. (2012). In spite of the
volume of time and energy that economists have dedicated to debate the empirical
relationship between aid and growth, the issue still remains inconclusive.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical
strategy and data. Section 3 presents evidence on the effects of environmental aid on
emissions. It also distinctly examines the effects of aid in renewables, non-renewables, and
energy supply infrastructure on emissions. Furthermore, this section thoroughly examines any
potential good policy, governance or income based heterogeneity in the data. Section 4
reports on a battery of robustness tests and section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
We use a panel dataset covering up to 131 countries observed over the period 1961 to 2011.5
To estimate the direct effects of environmental aid on emissions, we use the following
dynamic model:
1=it it it j i itit t iE E Aid t u# # " " "" % " "X (1)
5 Due to data limitations, not all specifications cover 131 countries. In most specifications, the panel is
unbalanced. The sample size is somewhat truncated for SO2 emissions and covers the time period 1961-2005.
Missing data is the only reason behind excluding a country-year from the sample. Appendix A1 presents a list of
countries included in the sample.
8where itE represents emissions of CO2 and SO2 in country i at year t , i is the country
fixed effects, t is a year dummy variable controlling for time varying common shocks, it
are country specific time trends. Country specific trend captures potential country specific
time varying factors that might affect emissions. The variable it jAid # is an indicator of energy
related aid received by country i in the year t j# . We also control for additional covariates
including GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared. This is represented by the vector itX .
We estimate this model for contemporaneous effects and lags j thus {0,1}j , . All variables
in equation 1 are defined as per capita and expressed in natural logarithms with the exception
of the aid variable. The aid variable it jAid # is defined using the generic transformation
ln[1 ]x" to account for zero observations. This transformation eliminates excessive skewness
and kurtosis in the data. Furthermore, all observations used to estimate equation 1 are five
year averages. Thus, each country in the panel dataset includes a maximum of 11 vertical
(time series) data points with the 2010 data point being the average of the years 2010 and
2011.
Our main focus of enquiry is the effect of energy related aid it jAid # on emissions itE .
Therefore, our coefficient of interest is which represents the average marginal effect (or
elasticity) of environmental aid on emissions. A negative and statistically significant
coefficient would imply that environmental aid is effective in lowering the levels of CO2 and
SO2 emissions. Alternatively, a positive and statistically significant coefficient would imply
that a higher level of environmental aid is associated with adverse emissions outcome.
Finally, another potential possibility is that the average marginal effect cannot be
distinguished from zero which would imply that environmental transfers have very little
discernible effect on emissions in the aid recipient countries.
9We include GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared to account for a potential
inverted U shaped relationship between the level of income and emissions commonly known
as Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Panayotou,
(1993) and Grossman and Krueger (1993) were the first to detect such empirical relationship.
They provide evidence that while economic growth is detrimental to the environment at early
stages of development the relationship between environmental quality and economic growth
reverses beyond a threshold level of development.
Our key dependent variables ( itE ) are CO2 and SO2 emissions. The CO2 emissions
data is sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank
and is measured in metric tons. This data is collected by the Carbon Dioxide Information
Analysis Centre of the Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory of
the United States located in Tennessee. Atmospheric CO2 is a key contributor to climate
change and global temperature rise. Combustion of fossil fuels is the predominant source of
CO2 emissions.
The SO2 emissions data is sourced from Smith et al. (2010) who provide estimates of
global and country-level emissions over the period 1850 to 2005. The dataset has been
developed by using calibrated country-level inventories information compiled from a number
of sources. Note that Smith et al. (2010) reports SO2 emissions in gigagrams rather than
kilotons. To facilitate uniformity of measurement across the two emissions variables we
multiply SO2 emissions by 1000 to convert it into metric tons.
Unlike CO2, SO2 is a local pollutant. SO2 emissions mainly come from the
combustion of coal and petroleum. Emission levels of SO2 peaked in 1991 and since then it
experienced a steady decline. The decline in coal fired power stations in Europe and the
adoption of unleaded fuels for car may have contributed to this decline.
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Environment quality is a multidimensional concept. Therefore there is some merit in
using a composite measure of environmental quality as opposed to emissions of individual
pollutants. One such measure is the Environmental Performance Index developed by
Emerson et al. (2010). This index is based on a large number of variables ranging from the
percentage of population with access to drinking water to CO2 emissions by the industrial
sector. However, poor data coverage is a major limitation of this dataset. Similarly, one could
also consider indices of other forms of environmental degradation. For example, one could
consider the measures of water quality, land degradation and deforestation. Again these
variables are restricted to a limited number of countries and time periods. In contrast, the CO2
and SO2 emissions data are available for a large number of countries and time periods. They
are also very widely used. It is worthwhile noting that we focus on emissions instead of
concentration of CO2 and SO2 because the former closely track economic activity rather than
the latter.
Rates of emission vary considerably across countries. For example, CO2 emission
ranges from 13.9 tons per capita in Chad over the period 1991 – 1995 to approximately 60
gigatons per capita in Qatar over the period 1996 – 2000. In contrast, SO2 emission ranges
from 0.2 tons per capita in Botswana over the period 1976 – 1980 to 403 tons per capita in
Zambia over the period 1961 – 1965.
Our key independent variable is energy related aid. This data is sourced from the
AidData.org, research release 2.1. This dataset is compiled by Tierney et al. (2011). The
Tierney et al. (2011) database distinguishes between development finance as loans from
governments or agencies from transfers. The AidData.org project is run by the Bingham
Young University, the College of William and Mary, and the Development Gateway. It
emerged out of two earlier projects on the Accessible Information on Development Activities
and Project-Level Aid. Both projects compiled project level aid data.
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The bulk of the data in AidData.org comes from the Creditor Reporting System
(CRS), which collects annual data from 22 member countries dating back to 1973. In addition
to CRS, AidData.org also includes data from other official sources. For instance, it records
bilateral donations from non-OECD donors to non-DAC recipients as well as donations from
multilateral organisations. In line with CRS, AidData.org adopts a five digit classification
system of projects. The classification system identifies the sector, the activity code, and the
purpose of each project. A major advantage of the dataset is that it distinguishes between aid
commitment and aid disbursement. The 2.1 research release that we use covers a large
number of countries over the period 1947 to 2011.6
AidData.org records aid commitment and disbursement for a large variety of projects.
We limit our attention to aid for environmental projects. In particular, we focus on: (i) power
generation projects from renewable sources, (ii) power generation projects from non-
renewable sources and (iii) energy generation and supply projects. The energy generation and
supply projects include power generation from renewables and non-renewables, energy
policy and administrative management, energy transmission, energy education, and energy
research.7
A zero value for the aid variable would imply that the donors did not commit or
disburse any money. A quick scrutiny of the raw data reveals that Palau received the highest
amount of energy related international financial assistance over the period 1996 – 2000 (USD
554 in 2009 constant prices) closely followed by Iceland 1966-1970 (USD 502 in 2009
constant prices) and Bahrain 1976-1980 (USD 432 in 2009 constant prices).
Other variables used in the study are: GDP per capita, law and order index,
corruption, democracy scores, trade openness index, trade share, private property rights,
6 We only use data from 1960 because the CO2 emissions data starts at 1960.
7 Note that power generation from renewables and non-renewables correspond to the purpose codes
23020 and 23030. The energy generation and supply corresponds to the following purpose codes: 23000, 23005,
23010, 23020, 23030, 23040, 23050, 23061, 23062, 23063, 23064, 23065, 23066, 23067, 23067, 23068, 23069,
23070, 23081 and 23082.
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government effectiveness. Tables 1 reports summary statistics on key variables and Appendix
A2 presents detailed definition of variables.
There are econometric challenges associated with estimating equation 1. These
challenges are unobserved heterogeneity, non-stationarity of the variables, reverse causation,
simultaneity bias, and bias due to the dynamic nature of the model. We closely follow
Clemens et al. (2010) to tackle these challenges. We address the unobserved heterogeneity
challenge by demeaning the data and estimating the model using fixed effects. However, the
fixed effect estimator is unable to tackle the challenge of non-stationarity. In a time series
dataset variables could have similar trends yielding statistically significant correlation.
However, this correlation could simply be reflective of their co-movement and not a causal
relationship. Therefore, estimating econometric models with variables that have a significant
time dimension and are not stationary would lead to spurious inference of causality when
there is none. To address this challenge we check stationarity of the variables by using the
Fisher type Adjusted Dickey Fuller (ADF), Levin–Lin–Chu, and Harris–Tzavalis varieties of
unit root tests. The Levin–Lin–Chu and the Harris–Tzavalis tests account for bias emanating
from cross-sectional association. We find that the key variables are I(1) or difference
stationary and therefore we use first difference of variables in the regressions. These tests are
reported in table 2. Note that Clemens et al. (2012) also reports similar results in the context
of aid and growth.
The level of emissions might dictate environmental aid flows rather than causality
running in the opposite direction. We address reverse causation and simultaneity challenges
by using five year averages and lags. An alternative approach is to use the instrumental
variable (IV) method. However, Clemens et al. (2012) demonstrates that using lags is a much
cleaner and transparent way of dealing with reverse causation as opposed to searching for an
appropriate instrument. Furthermore, they also show that the paucity of strong and valid
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instruments permeates the aid and growth literature.
Finally, using a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in the model
invites additional challenges. In particular, the differenced lagged dependent variable
1itE #$ could be correlated with the differenced error term itu$ contaminating inference.
However, for serially uncorrelated errors itu$ would not be correlated with 2itE #$ opening the
possibility of using 2itE #$ as an instrument for 1itE #$ . This is precisely what the Anderson
and Hsiao (1981) estimator does which we adopt here.
3 Evidence
3.1 Climate Aid and Emissions: Baseline Results
Table 3 conducts an empirical audit of the effects of climate aid on emissions. The key
independent variable here is the aid for power generation using both renewable and non-
renewable resources. We first concentrate on the effect of aid disbursement in panel A. In
column 1 we estimate equation 1 using the fixed effect estimator. We find that 1 percentage
point increase in aid for power generation using either renewable or non-renewable resources
reduce per capita CO2 emissions by 0.03 percent. To put this into perspective, a 0.03 percent
decline in per capita CO2 emission is equivalent to Qatar’s emission over the period 1996 –
2000 declining from 60 gigatons per person to 59.8 gigatons per person. Even though the
coefficient on aid is significant, we cannot be confident that it is precisely estimated. The
estimate could very well be driven by omitted factors or reverse causation. In column 2, we
replace the contemporaneous aid variable by lagged aid. The average effect of lagged aid on
per capita CO2 emission becomes indistinguishable from zero. In column 3 we estimate the
model using the Anderson and Hsiao instrumental variable method and the null effect result
remains. Note that this is also the preferred method of Clemens et al. (2012).
Since we are estimating a dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable, therefore
there is merit in pursuing the Arellano and Bond estimation method. We do exactly that in
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column 4 without much difference in outcome. The average effect of lagged aid on per capita
CO2 emission cannot be distinguished from zero.
In columns 5 – 8 we repeat these estimates to explain variation in another important
pollutant SO2. Irrespective of the estimator used, we are unable to distinguish the average
effect of aid disbursement for power generation using renewables and non-renewables from
zero. In panel B we verify whether the effect is any different with aid commitment as the key
independent variable as opposed to actual aid disbursement. It is plausible even though
unlikely that aid commitments might affect expectations and preferences of policymakers in
aid recipient countries incentivising them to implement emission reduction plans. We find
that aid commitments have very little discernible impact on per capita emissions.
It is possible that by aggregating aid for power generation in renewable and non-
renewable sources we are weakening statistical power. Perhaps there is heterogeneity in the
data. At least in theory, increasing the share of power generation using renewable resources
could rapidly reduce emissions. In contrast upgrading existing non-renewable resource based
power plants or building new power plants may not have the desired emissions reducing
effect. Therefore we divide the aid data for power generation into renewables and non-
renewables in table 4 columns 1, 2, 4, and 5. The effect stays insignificantly different from
zero.
In columns 3 and 6 we explore any potential impact of aid in energy generation and
supply. Energy generation and supply is a broad measure of climate aid which includes
power generation, energy policy and administration, energy transmission infrastructure,
energy awareness education, and energy research. To our surprise we do not find any effect
of such aid on per capita emissions after controlling for country specific and global factors.
3.2 Climate Aid and Emissions: The Role of Institutions and Policy
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The effectiveness of aid could be conditional on the country specific initial conditions.
Countries that have good policy and good institutions could be in a far better position to
respond to aid than others. Emissions respond better to aid in these locations because efficient
policy and institutions channel the funds effectively to the appropriate projects reducing
waste and administrative obstacles. If this is indeed the case then we would expect to see
non-linear effects of institutional quality on emissions.
We test the role of policy and institutions by introducing interaction terms in table 5.
In particular, we interact the aid for power generation variable with the rule of law index,
corruption, democracy scores, private property rights, government effectiveness, and Sachs
and Warner trade openness index. We do not find any evidence of non-linearity in the data.
The average effect of climate aid on CO2 and SO2 emissions is zero regardless of the quality
of institutions.
3.3 Climate Aid and Emissions: Is there a Rich and Poor Divide?
Upgrading to a new energy infrastructure or building a new power plant is not costless. On
the contrary these ventures are often expensive and require additional resources on top of the
aid money. Richer nations could afford these ventures and therefore they are far more
effective in upgrading their energy infrastructure or building new power plants. They could
also tap into a relatively skilled labour force to work on energy related projects. All this taken
together could contribute positively towards reducing per capita emissions.
If the hypothesis outlined above is indeed true then we would expect to see
heterogeneity in the data along income lines. However, in table 6 we do not find any evidence
that the level of income influences the effectiveness of climate aid.
3.3 Climate Aid and Emissions: The Role of Geography
Certain geographic locations could possess an advantage over others when it comes to
implementing emission reduction policies. Cleaning up the energy sector, upgrading to a new
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energy infrastructure, and building new power plants require significant investments. It also
requires importation of capital goods and skills. Therefore, proximity to these inputs matter.
If a country is located in the same neighbourhood where green technology is advancing then
it is likely to be part of the same network. The countries are more likely to utilise their
climate aid money effectively.
We test this hypothesis in table 7 by estimating our canonical model separately for
Asia, Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Middle
East and North Africa (MENA). We find that ECA countries are far more effective in
reducing their CO2 emissions using aid. Numerically, we find that 1 percentage point increase
in aid for power generation would reduce CO2 emissions by 0.31 percent. This amounts to
approximately 0.3 ton reduction in per capita emission in an average ECA country.
4 Robustness
The non-relationship between climate aid and emissions could be driven by outliers or
omitted variables. We check the robustness of our main result by controlling for outliers and
omitted covariates. In table 8 we estimate the model by eliminating potential outliers from the
sample. We do this systematically by identifying outliers using the formulas of DFITS,
Cooks Distance, and Welsch Distance. Dropping outliers from the sample do not alter our
main result.
In table 9 we introduce additional control variables. The environmental studies
literature have identified trade openness, urbanisation, school enrolment, investments, energy
use, and the fraction of population aged between 15 to 64 as important determinants of CO2
and SO2 emissions. We control for these variables and observe that the ineffectiveness of
climate aid on emissions remains.
5 Conclusions
Climate change and global temperature rise are significant challenges of our generation. The
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recent climate change conference COP21 held in Paris in December 2015 calls for
greenhouse gas emissions to a level consistent with an average global temperature rise of 2
degrees (possibly 1.5 degrees) above pre-industrial average temperature. A significant
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would be required in order to achieve this target.
Nations and multilateral organisations have used a plethora of policy tools to achieve
emissions reduction. One such policy is energy related international transfers. The idea is to
assist aid recipient countries to clean up existing energy infrastructure, build new greener
power plants, and switch from fossil fuel based energy mix to a renewables based energy
mix. Undoubtedly this is a worthy cause and donor countries have devoted significant amount
of resources to support this venture. Yet we know very little about the potential outcome of
this policy.
In this paper we perform an empirical audit of this policy by systematically exploring
the effect of energy related aid on CO2 and SO2 emissions. Using a global panel dataset
covering up to 131 countries over the period 1961 to 2011 and estimating a parsimonious
model using fixed effects, Arellano and Bond, and Anderson and Hsiao estimators we do not
find any evidence of a systematic effect of energy related aid on emissions. To our surprise,
we also find that the non-effect is not conditional on institutional quality or level of income.
Countries located in ECA do better than others in utilising climate aid to reduce CO2
emissions. Our results are robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, country specific
trends, time varying common shocks, GDP per capita, and GDP per capita squared as
controls. The exclusion of outliers and the inclusion of additional covariates such as trade
openness, urbanisation, human capital, investments, population density, per capita energy
use, and the share of adult population do not alter our fundamental result of zero average
effect.
This result calls into question the merit of climate aid as a policy tool to achieve the
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emission reduction objectives outlined in the Kyoto Protocol and beyond. It exposes that aid
of this nature has been fairly ineffective in the past. Therefore, policymakers would need to
be more circumspect while applying aid as a policy tool to address climate change. At the
very least our result calls for more scientific scrutiny of energy related aid.
Appendices
A1. List of Countries in the Sample:
Afghanistan Czech Republic Liberia Sao Tome & Principe
Albania Djibouti Libya Senegal
Algeria Dominica Lithuania Serbia
Antigua & Barb. Dominican Rep. Macedonia Seychelles
Argentina Ecuador Madagascar Sierra Leone
Armenia Egypt Malawi Singapore
Azerbaijan El Salvador Malaysia Slovak Republic
Bahamas Equatorial Guinea Maldives Solomon Islands
Bahrain Eritrea Mali South Africa
Bangladesh Estonia Malta Sri Lanka
Barbados Ethiopia Marshall Islands St. Kitts and Nevis
Belarus Fiji Mauritania St. Lucia
Belize Gabon Mauritius St. Vincent & Grenad.
Benin Gambia Mexico Sudan
Bhutan Georgia Micronesia Suriname
Bolivia Ghana Moldova Swaziland
Bosnia & Herzeg. Guatemala Mongolia Syrian Arab Republic
Botswana Guinea Morocco Tajikistan
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Tanzania
Brunei Darussalam Guyana Namibia Thailand
Bulgaria Haiti Nepal Togo
Burkina Faso Honduras Nicaragua Tonga
Burundi Hungary Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Cabo Verde Iceland Nigeria Tunisia
Cambodia India Oman Turkey
Cameroon Indonesia Pakistan Turkmenistan
Cent. African Rep. Iran Palau Uganda
Chad Iraq Panama Ukraine
Chile Ireland Papua N.Guinea Uruguay
China Jamaica Paraguay Uzbekistan
Colombia Jordan Peru Vanuatu
Comoros Kazakhstan Philippines Venezuela
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Poland Vietnam
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Congo, Rep. Kiribati Portugal Yemen
Costa Rica Korea, Rep. Qatar Zambia
Cote d'Ivoire Kyrgyz Republic Romania Zimbabwe
Croatia Lao PDR Russian Fed.
Cuba Latvia Rwanda
Cyprus Lebanon Samoa
Czech Republic Libya Serbia
A2. Data Appendix:
Variable Description Source
CO2 Carbon Dioxide emissions (metric tons per capita)
World Development Indicator
(World Bank)
GDP GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)
Trade Sum of exports and imports (% of GDP)
Urban Urban population
School Secondary school enrolment (% gross)
Ki Gross capital formation (% of GDP)
Energy Energy Use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)
P15-64 Population, ages 15-64 (% of total)
SO2 Sulphur Dioxide emissions (gigagram) Smith et al. (2010)
Aid (ren) Aid disbursed (committed) for renewable powergeneration ($ 2009 USD)
Aid Data 2.1.Aid(nonren) Aid disbursed (committed) for non-renewable powergeneration ($ 2009 USD)
Aid(energy) Aid disbursed (committed) for general energygeneration and supply ($ 2009 USD)
Law and Order Law and Order (0 to 6). Higher values indicate higherquality of government
ICRG
Corruption
Index
Corruption (0 to 6). Higher values indicate lower levels
of corruption
Democracy
Score
Democracy Index (-10 to 10). Higher values indicates
higher degree of democracy Marshall et al. (2013)
Openness
Index
Dummy variable coded 1 for countries classified as
open 0 otherwise Sachs and Warner (1995)
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Figure 1: Global CO2 Emission per capita since 1961
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Notes: Natural log of global CO2 emission per person covering the period 1961-2011. CO2 emission measured
in metric ton.
Figure 2: Global SO2 Emissions per capita since 1961
-5
-4
.8
-4
.6
-4
.4
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Notes: Natural log of global SO2 emission per person covering the period 1961-2005. SO2 emission measured in
gigagram.
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Figure 3: Foreign Aid Disbursement for Power Generation per capita from Renewable
and Non-Renewable Sources since 1973
0
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.4
.6
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Notes: Aid disbursement per person is defined as ln(1 / )Aid Population" covering the period 1973-2010. Aid
disbursement measured in 2009 constant US dollars.
Figure 4: Foreign Aid Commitment for Power Generation per capita from Renewable
and Non-Renewable Sources since 1961
.5
1
1.
5
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2.
5
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Notes: Aid commitment per person is defined as ln(1 / )Aid Population" covering the period 1961-2011. Aid
commitment measured in 2009 constant US dollars.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CO2 -0.132 1.505 -4.273 4.103
SO2 -4.825 1.452 -8.538 -0.913
Aid(ren+nonren) disb. 0.177 0.545 0.000 6.315
Aid(ren) disb. 0.075 0.263 0.000 2.549
Aid(nonren) disb. 0.200 0.642 0.000 6.315
Aid(energy) disb. 0.231 0.577 0.000 6.315
Aid(ren+nonren) comm. 1.353 1.234 0.000 6.590
Aid(ren) comm. 1.063 1.159 0.000 5.719
Aid(nonren) comm. 1.106 1.172 0.000 6.590
Aid(energy) comm. 1.761 1.161 0.001 7.007
GDP 7.278 1.169 4.816 10.879
Notes:. CO2 and SO2 emission are the key dependent variables. Aid(ren+nonren) is aid for power generation
from both renewable and non-renewable sources. Aid (ren) is aid for power generation from renewable sources
only. Aid(noren) is aid for power generation from non-renewable Sources only. Aid(energy) is aid for energy
generation and supply. Disb. and comm. indicate disbursement and commitment, respectively. All variables
are measured as logs of per capita terms. The aid variables are measured as ln(1 )x" . The analysis on CO2
(SO2) emission covers the years between 1961 and 2011 (1961 and 2005).
Table 2: Unit Root Test
CO2 SO2
Aid
Disb
Aid
Comm
Panel A: Levels
Inverse chi-squared 0.000 0.951 0.921 0.005
Inverse normal 0.218 0.996 0.844 0.102
Inverse logit t 0.038 0.998 0.264 0.000
Modified inv. chi-squared 0.000 0.945 0.915 0.002
Panel B: First Difference
Inverse chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inverse normal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inverse logit t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Modified inv. chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table illustrates the p-values from Fisher-type ADF unit root tests. All variables are measured as log
of per capita terms. The aid variables are measured as ln(1 )x" . The Aid variables used in this table are the ‘Aid
for Power Generation using Renewable and Non-renewable Resources’ Commitment and Disbursement. Each
line refers to a specific transformation used to combine the p-values form unit-root tests computed for each
panel individually. We also conduct Levin-Lin-Chu and Harris-Tzavalis varieties of unit root tests. These tests
account for bias emanating frm cross-sectional association. The results are qualitatively similar
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Table 3: Climate Aid and Emissions
CO2 Emissions SO2 Emissions
1971-2011 1971-2005
Panel A: Disbursement
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
A-H
(4)
A-B
(5)
OLS
(6)
OLS
(7)
A-H
(8)
A-B
yt-1 0.157*** 0.135* 0.421* 0.388*** 0.157 0.166** 0.372** 0.319
(0.050) (0.075) (0.237) (0.085) (0.136) (0.072) (0.175) (0.347)
Aidt -0.032* 0.020
(0.018) (0.065)
Aidt-1 -0.009 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.012 -0.021
(0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.049) (0.051) (0.076)
GDPt 0.812 1.876*** 1.793*** 2.083*** 2.448* 2.332 2.417** 3.245**
(0.906) (0.480) (0.666) (0.662) (1.467) (1.413) (1.201) (1.286)
GDP2t 0.003 -0.088*** -0.091** -0.108** -0.133 -0.163 -0.171** -
(0.071) (0.033) (0.045) (0.046) (0.103) (0.101) (0.086) (0.092)
Observations 509 420 420 420 293 217 217 217
Countries 135 128 128 128 87 78 78 78
R2 0.301 0.221 0.079 0.058
Weak test 5.922 6.725
AR(2) 0.428 0.309
Hansen test 0.034 0.042
1961-2011 1961-2005
Panel B: Commitment
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
A-H
(4)
A-B
(5)
OLS
(6)
OLS
(7)
A-H
(8)
A-B
yt-1 0.164*** 0.146** 0.611** 0.446*** 0.173 0.179** 0.580*** 0.229
(0.049) (0.072) (0.276) (0.150) (0.134) (0.080) (0.221) (0.230)
Aidt -0.000 0.077*
(0.010) (0.046)
Aidt-1 -0.007 -0.013 -0.014 0.008 -0.037 0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.031) (0.029)
GDPt 0.772 1.710*** 1.701** 2.211*** 1.786 1.159 1.569 1.872
(0.852) (0.536) (0.755) (0.632) (1.495) (1.539) (1.127) (1.548)
GDP2t 0.008 -0.068* -0.081 -0.114*** -0.08 -0.057 -0.092 -0.099
(0.067) (0.038) (0.051) (0.044) (0.105) (0.111) (0.081) (0.116)
Observations 534 455 455 455 313 245 245 245
Countries 137 131 131 131 88 80 80 80
R2 0.312 0.261 0.125 0.072
Weak test 6.829 10.229
AR(2) 0.374 0.164
Hansen test 0.039 0.045
Notes: The table reports Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Anderson–Hsiao (A-H) and Arellano and Bond (A-B)
estimates. All variables are expressed as first difference as they are I(1). They are also measured in logs of per capita.
1ty # denotes the lagged dependent variable. The aid variables here are expressed as ln(1 )x" . The Aid variable used in
this table is the ‘Aid for Power Generation using Renewable and Non-renewable Resources’. The figures in the
parentheses are clustered standard errors with clustering at the country level. The last two lines of the table reports the
p-values of the Arellano and Bond test (AR2) and Hansen test. Weak test is the Stock-Yogo F-test for weak
instruments. F-statistic greater than 10 implies strong instrument. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All specifications include a constant.
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Table 4: Aid for Power Generation and Emissions
CO2 Emissions SO2 Emissions
Panel A: Disbursement
Renewables Non-renewables
Energy
Generation
& Supply
Renewables Non-renewables
Energy
Generation
& Supply
(1)
1976-2011
(2)
1971-2011
(3)
1961-2011
(4)
1976-2005
(5)
1971-2005
(6)
1961-2005
Aidt-1 -0.018 0.015 0.008 0.155 -0.037 0.022
(0.038) (0.033) (0.018) (0.206) (0.026) (0.031)
Controls yt-1, GDPt, GDP2t
Observations 315 242 645 156 152 356
Countries 108 90 150 57 63 97
Weak test 4.383 1.937 13.699 14.466 4.863 12.799
Panel B: Commitment
Renewables Non-renewables
Energy
Generation
& Supply
Renewables Non-renewables
Energy
Generation
& Supply
(1)
1961-2011
(2)
1961-2011
(3)
1961-2011
(4)
1961-2005
(2)
1961-2005
(3)
1961-2005
Aidt-1 -0.013 -0.029 -0.009 0.005 -0.068** 0.025
(0.011) (0.018) (0.008) (0.033) (0.029) (0.040)
Controls yt-1, GDPt, GDP2t
Observations 351 247 653 188 157 364
Countries 109 92 150 58 65 97
Weak test 4.032 3.104 13.138 12.759 7.155 13.973
Notes: The table reports Anderson–Hsiao (A-H) estimates. All variables are expressed as first difference
as they are I(1). They are also measured in logs of per capita. 1ty # denotes the lagged dependent variable.
The aid variables here are expressed as ln(1 )x" . The Aid variable used in columns 1 and 4 is the ‘Aid
for Power Generation using Renewable Resources’. The Aid variable used in columns 2 and 5 is the ‘Aid
for Power Generation using Non-Renewable Resources’. The Aid variable used in columns 3 and 6 is the
‘Aid for Energy Generation and Supply’. The figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors with
clustering at the country level. Weak test is the Stock-Yogo F-test for weak instruments. F-statistic
greater than 10 implies strong instrument. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively. All specifications include a constant.
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Notes: The table reports Anderson–Hsiao (A-H) estimates. All variables are expressed as first difference as they
are I(1). They are also measured in logs of per capita. 1ty # denotes the lagged dependent variable. The aid
variable here is expressed as ln(1 )x" . The Aid variable used in this table is the ‘Aid for Power Generation
using Renewable and Non-renewable Resources’. Low is a dummy variable for low-income countries as
classified by the OECD DAC. The figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors with clustering at the
country level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All
specifications include a constant.
Table 7: Climate Aid and Emissions: Examining Heterogeneity Across Continents
CO2 emissions SO2 emissions
Panel A: Disbursement
1971-2011 1971-2005
(1)
ASIA
(2)
ECA
(3)
LAC
(4)
MENA
(5)
ASIA
(6)
ECA
(7)
LAC
(8)
MENA
Aidt-1 0.051 -0.31*** 0.063 -0.025 0.238 10.08 0.064 -0.001
(0.035) (0.10) (0.117) (0.045) (0.288) (170.01) (0.165) (0.051)
Controls yt-1, GDPt, GDP2t
Observations 98 41 86 195 53 20 58 86
Countries 28 22 26 52 14 16 20 28
Panel B: Commitment
1961-2011 1961-2005
(1)
ASIA
(2)
ECA
(3)
LAC
(4)
MENA
(5)
ASIA
(6)
ECA
(7)
LAC
(8)
MENA
Aidt-1 -0.050 0.007 -0.020 -0.009 -0.122 0.15 -0.083 -0.053
(0.041) (0.028) (0.018) (0.015) (0.105) (0.08) (0.078) (0.040)
Controls yt-1, GDPt, GDP2t
Observations 108 44 97 206 61 23 69 92
Countries 29 23 26 53 15 17 20 28
Notes: The table reports Anderson–Hsiao (A-H) estimates. All variables are expressed as first difference as they
are I(1). They are also measured in logs of per capita. 1ty # denotes the lagged dependent variable. The aid
variable here is expressed as ln(1 )x" . The Aid variable used in this table is the ‘Aid for Power Generation
using Renewable and Non-renewable Resources’. ASIA, ECA, LAC and MENA indicate Asian (East and South
Asia and Pacific), European and Central Asian, Latin American and Caribbean and Middle East and African
Table 6: Climate Aid and Emissions: The Effect of Income
CO2 emissions SO2 emissions
1961-2011 1961-2005
(1)
Disbursement
(2)
Commitment
(3)
Disbursement
(4)
Commitment
Aidt-1 0.010 -0.007 -0.003 0.025
(0.018) (0.008) (0.028) (0.042)
Low 0.012 0.010 0.009 -0.018
(0.023) (0.024) (0.040) (0.051)
Low*Aidt-1 -0.054 -0.017 0.488*** -0.005
(0.087) (0.039) (0.182) (0.098)
Controls yt-1, GDPt, GDP2t
Observations 645 653 356 364
Countries 150 150 97 97
30
region, respectively. The figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors with clustering at the country
level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All specifications
include a constant.
Table 8: Climate Aid and Emissions: Outlier Sensitivity Tests
CO2 emissions SO2 emissions
Panel A: Disbursement
1971-2011 1971-2005
(1)
DFITS
(2)
COOK
(3)
WELSCH
(4)
DFITS
(5)
COOK
(6)
WELSCH
Aidt-1 0.031 0.031 0.026 -0.004 -0.004 -0.019
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.060) (0.060) (0.051)
Controls yt-1, GDPt, GDP2t
Observations 394 394 407 199 199 205
Countries 124 124 127 71 71 75
Panel B: Commitment
1961-2011 1961-2005
(1)
DFITS
(2)
COOK
(3)
WELSCH
(4)
DFITS
(5)
COOK
(6)
WELSCH
Aidt-1 -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 -0.035 -0.035 -0.032
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Controls yt-1, GDPt, GDP2t
Observations 424 424 441 229 229 233
Countries 125 125 130 73 73 76
Notes: The table reports Anderson–Hsiao (A-H) estimates. All variables are expressed as first difference as they
are I(1). They are also measured in logs of per capita. 1ty # denotes the lagged dependent variable. The aid
variable here is expressed as ln(1 )x" . The Aid variable used in this table is the ‘Aid for Power Generation
using Renewable and Non-renewable Resources’. In columns 1&4 observations are omitted if |Cooksdi|>4/n; in
columns 2&5 observations are omitted if |DFITSi|>2(k/n)1/2; and in columns 3&6 observations are omitted if
|Welschdi|>3k1/2. Here n is the number of observation and k is the number of independent variables in the
regression model including the intercept. The figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors with
clustering at the country level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. All specifications include a constant.
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